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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, l 
Plaintiff-Respondent, i 
V • I 
STEVEN J. PYEATT, 1 
Defendant-Appellant. i 
t Case No. 880274-CA 
t Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction in the Third District 
Court for a second degree felony offense of Unlawful Possession 
of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute for Value, 
and two class B misdemeanor offenses, Possession of a Controlled 
Substance and Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1988), because the appeal results from a 
criminal conviction in the District Court for a crime other than 
a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether Judge Sheila McCleve was justified in 
finding the totality of the circumstances set out in Officer 
Droubay's affidavit established the probable cause necessary to 
issue a search warrant pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the 
federal constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
constitution. 
2. Whether the affidavit of Officer Droubay was made 
in a good faith belief of its accuracy and completeness in 
establishing the grounds for the issuance of a search warrant for 
533 Montgomery. 
3. Whether the evidence to be seized from the 
residence at 533 Montgomery was described with sufficient 
particularity to guide the officers to what was to be seized. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
For purposes of this brief, respondent relies on the 
following provisions: 
Article I, Section 14, Utah Constitution 
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with a second degree felony 
offense which occurred on or about March 10, 1987, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1988), Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute 
for Value, to-wit: Cocaine, a Schedule II Narcotic Controlled 
Substance; a Class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), Unlawful Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, to-wit: Marijuana, a Schedule I Controlled 
Substance; and a Class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1986), Unlawful Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia (R. 14-15). 
On May 4, 1987, appellant filed a motion to suppress 
the evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant which had been 
issued by the Honorable Sheila McCleve based upon an affidavit 
submitted by Officer Mike Droubay of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office (R. 17-18 and 25). On September 17, 1988, the 
motion to suppress came on for hearing before the Honorable 
Kenneth Rigtrup. After hearing oral testimony and reviewing 
written briefs prepared by counsel, Judge Rigtrup found that the 
evidence had not been obtained in violation of federal or state 
law and denied appellant's motion to suppress evidence and set 
the matter for a hearing on a later date (R. 79). 
Appellant was found guilty on all counts by Judge 
Rigtrup at a bench trial held February 8, 1988 (R. 81). 
Appellant appeals his conviction based upon Judge Rigtrupfs 
denial of appellant's earlier motion to suppress evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Judge Sheila McCleve issued a search warrant for the 
premises at 533 South Montgomery, 1575 West, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on March 10, 1987 (See R. 25 and Addendum A, a copy of the 
search warrant.) The warrant was issued based on probable cause 
shown in an affidavit submitted by Officer Mike Droubay of the 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, narcotics division. (See R. 
25 and Addendum B, a copy of the affidavit.) The affidavit 
stated that the officer had reason to believe that evidence, 
described as cocaine, and drug paraphernalia were being possessed 
illegally at 533 South Montgomery, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Information gathered through surveillance and the use 
of a confidential informant (C.I.) served as the basis for 
officer Droubay's affidavit. The affidavit (R. 25 and Addendum 
B) states how the confidential informant served to make 
controlled buys of cocaine. The C.I. on two separate occasions 
entered into 4545 Atherton, in the Lexia Haven Apartment Complex, 
building #7, Apartment 144, to make a controlled buy of cocaine. 
On each occasion after the C.I. entered the apartment and 
tendered the money, a white male, known to the officers at that 
time only as "Randy," left the apartment and proceeded to the 533 
South Montgomery address. The officers believed that the cocaine 
was obtained at the Montgomery address based on the direct 
observation of "Randy" travelling to that address and from 
additional information from the C.I. The C.I. stated that he had 
received a phone call at the Atherton address from "Randy" during 
the time that officers were observing that "Randy" was at the 
Montgomery address. "Randy" told the C.I. that the "stuff" was 
on the scale and that he would be back (R. 25). Complete details 
of the controlled buys and surveillance can be found in Officer 
Droubay's affidavit. (See Addendum B.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A reasonable belief that evidence will be found where 
an affiant believes it to be is sufficient to establish probable 
cause upon which a magistrate can issue a search warrant for the 
premises. United States v. Dill, 693 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir. 1982). 
After a magistrate finds probable cause, great deference should 
be paid to that decision. Overturning such a finding by a 
magistrate, such as in this case, is proper only if the reviewing 
court firmly believes that a mistake has been made. State v. 
Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). 
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Search warrants issued upon the information of 
informants are to be viewed in the "totality-of-the-
circumstances" to determine if probable cause exists. Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 
(Utah 1983). Individual elements of an affidavit such as an 
informant's reliability and the basis of his or her knowledge, 
considered as independently important at times in the past, are 
"but two relevant considerations, among others, in determining 
the existence of probable cause under 'a totality-of-the-
circumstances'. They are not strict, independent requirements tc 
be 'rigidly exacted' in every case." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 
127, 130 (Utah 1987) The totality of the circumstances in this 
case clearly exhibits the facts upon which the finding of 
probable cause is justified. 
Further, appellant has failed to establish any evidence 
that statements made in the affidavit are false statements 
intentionally or recklessly made to mislead the magistrate. 
Appellant has also failed to show that the affidavit lacks 
particularity as to the items to be seized from the address at 
533 Montgomery. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SET OUT IN 
OFFICER DROUBAY'S AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHES 
PROBABLE CAUSE WHICH THE JUDGE RIGHTFULLY 
DEEMED SUFFICIENT TO ISSUE A SEARCH WARRANT 
PURSUANT TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 
14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
A. A FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE BY A 
MAGISTRATE SHOULD BE GIVEN GREAT DEFERENCE BY 
A REVIEWING COURT. 
The standard set out for the issuance of a search 
warrant under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution is ". . .no warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause . . . ." Evidence need not be read in a technical fashion, 
but in a practical, everyday manner to determine if a reasonably 
prudent man would determine an offense had been committed. 
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1964); United States v. 
Garhart, 157 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1946); State v. Fort, 572 P.2d 
1387 (Utah 1977); State v. Treadwayf 499 P.2d 846 (Utah 1972). 
"Probable cause for a search warrant is nothing more 
than a reasonable belief that the evidence sought is located at a 
place indicated by the policeman's affidavit." United States v. 
Dill, 693 F.2d 1012, 1014 (10th Cir. 1982). In the instant case, 
Judge McCleve determined that probable cause existed for the 
issuance of a search warrant for 533 Montgomery. Both state and 
federal courts give great deference to a magistrate's 
determination of probable cause and some deference to the officer 
who makes the effort to obtain a valid search warrant. U.S. v. 
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); U.S. v. Depuqh, 452 F.2d 915 
(10th Cir. 1971); U.S. v. Rahn, 511 F.2d 290 (10th Cir. 1975). 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715, (Utah 
1983), established under state law that "[a] reviewing court 
should pay great deference to a magistrate's determination of 
probable cause." Ld. at 719; see also State v. Gallegos, 712 
P.2d 207 (Utah 1985). It is the duty and prerogative of the 
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magistrate to determine the sufficiency of the affidavit. The 
magistrate's finding should not be overturned unless he or she 
was clearly in error. State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392, 490 P.2d 
334 (1971). More recently, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, (Utah 1987), stated, "the question for the 
appellate court . . . is not whether it would have made the 
findings the trial court did, but whether 'on the entire evidence 
[it] is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been committed. ' •• Id. at 1258, fn. 5, quoting Zenith Radio 
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123, 89 S.Ct. 
1562, 1576, 23 L.Ed.2d. 129 (1969). 
In the case at hand, appellant in his brief admits that 
the affidavit of officer Droubay could have raised a suspicion of 
probable cause that drugs could be found at the Montgomery 
address (Brief of Appellant at 9). This admission alone 
undermines appellant's entire argument of insufficient probable 
cause. The state cases cited, including State v. Anderson, 701 
P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985), State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 
1983), State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984), and State v. 
Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987), all establish that the issue of 
sufficient probable cause is for the magistrate to decide, unless 
clear error exists. No clear error exists in this case, since 
even the appellant concedes that the affidavit of officer Droubay 
raised a suspicion of probable cause. In a case involving 
factual questions such as whether a suspicion of illegality 
approaches the realm of probable cause, the magistrate's decision 
governs. 
B. INFORMANT-BASED PROBABLE CAUSE IS 
ESTABLISHED BY A PRACTICAL, COMMON SENSE 
DETERMINATION RENDERED UNDER THE "TOTALITY-
OF-THE-CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST. 
Probable cause determination under "informant-based" 
search warrants was at one time governed by the two pronged 
"Aquilar-Spinelli" test. Basically, the test required that the 
facts and circumstances justify conclusions that (1) the illegal 
items were in fact at the location intended to be searched, and 
(2) the informant was reliable. The Supreme Court liberalized 
the standard for search warrants in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213 (1983), by abandoning the Aquilar-Spinelli line of cases and 
adopting a "totality of the circumstances" test in determining 
probable cause. That Court said: 
The task of the issuing magistrate is 
simply to make a practical, common-sense 
decision whether, given all the circumstances 
set forth in the affidavit before him, 
including the "veracity" and "basis of 
knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay 
information, there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence will be found in a 
particular place. 
Id. at 238. 
The Court effectively determined that a common-sense evaluation 
of all of the facts and circumstances controls in finding that 
probable cause existed to issue a search warrant, and not a 
technical evaluation of warrants and supporting affidavits. 
Gates also reaffirmed the standard of probable cause as "only the 
probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal 
activity." Ijd. at 235. See also United States v. Ventresca, 380 
U.S. 102 (1965). 
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In Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), the 
Supreme Court stated: 
In dealing with probable cause, . . . as 
the very name implies, we deal with 
probabilities. These are not technical; they 
are factual and practical considerations of 
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent 
men, not legal technicians act. Probable 
cause exists where the facts and 
circumstances within [the arresting 
officers'] knowledge and of which they had 
reasonably trustworthy information [are] 
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that an 
offense has been or is being committed. 
Id. at 313. 
The Utah Supreme Court adopted the Illinois v. Gates 
principle in State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983), 
agreeing to view an affidavit "in its entirety and in a common-
sense fashion . . . .H
 <Id. at 1102. Search warrants can issue 
on the fair probability that the evidence will be found at the 
place to be searched. The Utah Supreme Court has also long held 
that the standard of probable cause is the probability of 
criminal activity based on a common-sense reading of the 
affidavit. State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 846, 847-
848 (Utah 1972). See also: State v. Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (Utah 
1977); State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984). 
In State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court continued clarification of its position regarding 
the issuance of search warrants based on a common-sense reading 
of an affidavit by stating, "[e]xcessive technical dissection of 
an informant's tip or of the nontechnical language in the 
officer's affidavit is ill-suited to this task." Id. at 130. 
The Court continues on to further establish that the dissection 
of independent requirements operating together to establish 
probable cause is not appropriate under the totality standard: 
The indicia of veracity, reliability, and 
basis of knowledge are nonexclusive elements 
to be evaluated in reaching the practical, 
common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances, there is a fair probability 
that the contraband will be found in the 
place described. 
Id. at 130. 
Appellant in his brief correctly sets out the standard 
established by Gates and adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Anderton, and also correctly points out that great deference 
should be paid to a magistrate's determination of probable cause 
(Brief of Appellant at 8-9). Appellant then admits the affidavit 
may have raised a suspicion that the cocaine purchased by the 
C.I. came from the Montgomery address. Given appellant's 
admission that a suspicion could have been raised and his 
agreement with the Gates' totality standard, appellant is left 
with attacking Judge McCleve's determination that probable cause 
existed. That attack is inconsistent with the review standard of 
paying deference to a magistrate's determination of probable 
cause. 
Officer's Droubay's affidavit is based upon his 
personal observations of his C.I. and information supplied by the 
informant. The only confidential informant alluded to in the 
affidavit is the "informant" mentioned to in the document. The 
C.I.'s reliability is established in the affidavit by stating his 
prior experience and the accuracy of information provided by him 
in the past (R. 25 at 4 and Addendum B at 4). In using the 
totality standard, the precise number of arrests and warrants 
issued by reason of information provided by the C.I in the past 
is irrelevant. The question is whether the totality of the 
circumstances shows the confidential informant to be reliable. 
The C.I.'s reliability is also verified by the nature 
of the "controlled" buys. Each purchase was controlled by 
searching the C.I. prior to and after each purchase. Officers 
also directly observed "Randy" leave the premises as the C.I. 
told them that he had done on both occasions. Officers further 
observed "Randy" go inside the appellant's residence at the 533 
Montgomery address prior to the point in time that the C.I said 
"Randy" telephoned from a location other than the Atherton 
address. The officers then saw appellant exit after that time. 
The police officers' observation of "Randy" coupled with the 
reliability of the C.I.'s representations lead a reasonable 
person to conclude that a fair probability exists that cocaine 
was being possessed at the 533 Montgomery address. That 
justified Judge McCleve's finding of probable cause to issue a 
search warrant. 
In many cases similar to this case, the courts have 
upheld the magistrate's issuance of a search warrant. In State 
v. Moore# 441 So.2d 1003 (Ala. Ct. App. 1983), the issued search 
warrant was upheld where the affidavit stated that a cocaine 
dealer went straight to the defendant's house and obtained 
cocaine. The court ruled that the facts warranted a conclusion 
that cocaine was likely to be found on the premises. See also 
State v. Mena, 399 So.2d 149 (La. 1981) (before the sale, the 
dealer told the agent he had to get drugs from his connection and 
went to defendant's premises); and State v. Yaritzf 287 N.W.2d 13 
(Minn. 1979) (two sales elsewhere, each time the defendant was 
observed going straight from his house to the place of sale) 
In People v. Chase, 675 P.2d 315 (Colo. 1984), the 
seller of drugs told the informant that he had to go elsewhere 
for the drugs and subsequently drove to defendant's address and 
remained there for 11 minutes before returning to complete the 
sale. The court ruled that there was sufficient probable cause 
to issue a search warrant for defendant's premises. In the case 
at hand, one should note that a search warrant was not sought 
until the officers had observed on two separate occasions the 
person identified as "Randy" proceed to the Montgomery address 
during the time that the C.I. was making a controlled buy of 
cocaine. The separate buys served to show the existence of 
something more than mere coincidence in "Randy" proceeding to an 
address fifteen minutes away, staying only a few minutes then 
driving straight back to the Atherton address, where a customer 
has been waiting the entire time. 
Appellant attempts in his brief to cut the 
circumstances encompassed in the affidavit into pieces for strict 
scrutiny to avoid the accepted Gates totality standard. For 
example, appellant argues such things as that specific instances 
of the officer's wording in the affidavit, taken out of context, 
preclude the Court from finding probable cause (Appellant brief 
12-
at 12). The Utah Supreme Court in Hansen specifically decried 
such "excessive technical dissection" under the totality standard 
as has been previously argued in this brief. 732 P.2d at 130. 
Appellant also attempts to argue that the facts 
contained in the affidavit were stale. In Hansen, where (as in 
the instant case) five days had passed since the last report of 
drugs on the premises, the Court stated, M[a] mere passage of 
time does not necessarily invalidate the supporting basis for the 
warrant"; the important factor is whether "a common-sense reading 
of that affidavit suggested the continuing nature of the drug's 
presence." ^d. at 131. In the instant case, the affidavit in 
totality suggests that the Montgomery address is being used for 
possession and the distribution of drugs. Officer Droubay 
specifically states that officers, including himself, had 
observed "Randy" proceeding to the Montgomery address on two 
occasions a number of days apart. The obtaining of illegal drugs 
on separate occasions from an address away from the place of 
purchase suggests the on-going nature of the business at the 
Montgomery address and the continuing validity of the information 
contained in the affidavit. In this instance, as in Hansen, the 
facts in the affidavit are not shown to be stale. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE 
EXISTENCE OF ANY FALSE OR OMITTED STATEMENTS 
MADE KNOWINGLY OR WITH RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR 
THE TRUTH IN THE AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING THE 
ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT 
In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978), the 
Suoreme Court held* 
Where the defendant makes a substantial 
preliminary showing that a false statement 
knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless 
disregard for the truth, was included by the 
affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the 
allegedly false statement is necessary to the 
finding of probable cause, the Fourth 
Amendment requires that a hearing be held at 
the defendant's request. In the event that 
at that hearing the allegation of perjury or 
reckless disregard for the truth, is 
established by the defendant by a 
preponderance of the evidence, and, with the 
affidavit's remaining content is insufficient 
to establish probable cause, the search 
warrant must be voided and the fruits of the 
search excluded to the same extent as if 
probable cause was lacking on the face of the 
affidavit. 
Id. at 155-56. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 
188 (Utah 1986) followed the Franks Fourth Amendment analysis. 
See also State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Appellant contends that the affidavit contains 
intentional misstatements and material omissions and bases his 
argument mainly on the premise that the magistrate issuing the 
warrant is incapable of reading an affidavit in its entirety and 
understanding what is written if more than one name and one 
address are used. (Brief of Appellant at 24) Appellant's 
reliance on the Franks quote on page 23 of his brief in 
attempting to establish that magistrates review affidavits with 
such haste as to not understand what is written is clearly 
misplaced. The quote used clearly refers to the magistrate's 
inability to independently evaluate the affiant or the 
information as reliable, not the magistrates's actual examination 
of what has been included in the affidavit. In the present case, 
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the affidavit expressly states how the evidence has been gathered 
and how the two residential addresses are involved. 
Appellant argues that the C.I. did not obtain the 
cocaine at 533 Montgomery. Strict scrutiny of this sentence 
alone could lead a person to interpret the sentence to mean that 
the C.I. made the buys at 533 Montgomery; however, the document 
when read as a whole, states specifically that the drugs were 
reasonably believed to be at 533 Montgomery, while the C.I. 
transferred the money and received the drugs while in the 
Atherton address. Even if that one sentence were to be stricken 
from the document, probable cause supporting the issuance of the 
warrant still remains intact. 
Appellant also contends that the use of the name 
"Randy" instead of "Brad" is an intentional or reckless 
misstatement. The record of Officer Droubay's testimony 
adequately establishes that the person observed travelling to the 
Montgomery address was known to the officer as "Randy" at the 
time that the warrant was issued (R. 99 at 16-18 and 47-49). The 
real name is of no importance here, because the person referred 
to as "Randy" is the same person throughout the affidavit (R. 99 
at 52 and 61). It was only later, after the search, that 
officers learned that the name "Randy" was an alias (R. 99 at 48 
and 52). 
The allegedly omitted information such as the number of 
residents at the Atherton address and the presence of officers 
during the following of "Randy" to 533 Montgomery were not of 
importance to the finding or not finding of probable cause in the 
affidavit. (See R. 99 at 75-77, officer Rigby's testimony 
regarding leaving an officer where the buy occurs.) Even if this 
information were material to the finding of probable cause, 
appellant has made no valid argument to show such omissions or 
misrepresentations were intentional or reckless disregard for the 
truth. Officer Droubay provided a detailed outline of the 
occurrences leading up to drafting of the affidavit for the 
issuance of the search warrant. Every contention made by 
appellant is clarified by simply reading the affidavit in its 
entirety. The affidavit is not difficult to read and understand. 
Appellant also alleges that information relating to the 
C.I.'s motives were intentionally omitted to mislead a very 
easily misled magistrate. Again, appellant has failed to 
consider the totality of the circumstances in his piecemeal 
attack on information contained in the affidavit. The affidavit 
clearly established that the C.I. had been used in the past and 
was known to provide truthful information which had resulted in 
the production of illicit drugs in each instance (R. 25 at 4 and 
Addendum B at 4). Each C.I. used by officers will have some 
motive for providing information, but those motives have never 
been deemed by the courts to be independently vital to 
establishing informant reliability. The affidavit establishes 
the C.I.'s reliability; his motives in any one incident of 
supplying information does not function to destroy that 
reliability. Appellant is ultimately asking this Court to 
require that certain specific information be found in affidavits 
before a warrant can be issued. Such a request is inconsistent 
with the totality approach to a finding of probable cause. 
Appellant states that the Utah courts can construe 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah constitution differently from 
the Fourth Amendment. Appellant's basic argument is well taken; 
however, the circumstances in the instant case do not merit a 
varying construction. In Neilsony 727 P.2d at 193, the court 
stated that the Article I provision could be construed 
differently from the Fourth Amendment if an intentional 
misstatement is made in the affidavit. As has been established, 
appellant has failed to show that the affidavit contains any 
intentional, reckless, or even negligent misstatements which 
would invalidate the warrant. 
POINT III 
THE ITEMS TO BE SEIZED FROM THE MONTGOMERY 
ADDRESS WERE DESCRIBED WITH SUFFICIENT 
PARTICULARITY FOR PURPOSES OF ISSUING THE 
SEARCH WARRANT. 
In Allen v Holbrook, 135 P.2d 242 (Utah 1943), the Utah 
Supreme Court ruled that goods to be seized pursuant to a search 
warrant needed to be described with particularity in the 
documents requesting the search. In the instance of illicit 
drugs to be seized, general descriptions of the items may be 
used. State v. Galleqos, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985). The 
Supreme Court in Galleqos quotes language contained in Namen v. 
State, 665 P.2d 557 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), one portion of which 
reproduced in whole reads: 
In cases involving contraband, such as drugs, 
generic descriptions have commonly been 
permitted because the contraband is, by its 
very nature, illegal and a detailed 
description will provide no meaningful 
guidance beyond that afforded by a generic 
one. 
Id. at 561. 
In the instant case, the illicit drug cocaine is 
described as Ma white powdery substance" (R. 25 at 1 and Addendum 
A at 1). Other items to be seized include drug-cutting agents 
which could be any number of substances used to augment the drug 
to be sold. They must, however, be a substance which, by its 
very appearance and nature, could be mixed with cocaine to 
increase the volume of the drug to be sold. The officers could 
not seize any substance which could not have been used to 
increase the volume of the cocaine. A more detailed description 
of the drug and drug paraphernalia could not be given. The 
importance of the description lies in the protection of 
appellant's rights in legally possessed property. Appellant has 
no rights in illegal drugs whatsoever, so a more specific 
description of cocaine is not necessary. State v. Robinson, 677 
P.2d 1348, 1349 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). 
Appellant's claim that the warrant lacks particularity 
is not based on any established case law, and is in fact contrary 
to existing law. Lack of particularity in an illicit drug case 
such as this one is a frivolous claim which does not warrant this 
Court's serious consideration. In the case at hand, the specific 
drug of cocaine was described in particular, along with the 
instruments used to facilitate the drug's distribution including 
scales, packaging and cutting agents. Items to be seized 
included all the specific items reasonably believed to be at the 
Montgomery address. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm the finding of the lower court and deny appellant's 
request for a new trial or dismissal. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / 7 day of January, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
iVt'VG^c 
~~"> 
t^v L> 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Brooke C. Wells and Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association, attorneys for defendant, 424 East 500 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, this /7 of January, 1989. 
{cAe-^e * i^^srl 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
n i ^ n 
DAVID E . YOCOM ' I L L U 
£TXo$mTyLEMCKE ™ VM 23 » "• K 
Deputy County Attorney 
Courtside Office Building 
251 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
N„. onw 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah. 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by 
C. Mike Droubay - Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, Narcotics 
Division, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe 
That (X) on the premises known as 533 South Montgomery, 1575 West, 
the east side of a red brick duplex, with white trim and 
a red front porch with black rod iron railing. 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there 
is now certain property or evidence described as: 
Cocaine, a white powdery substance, cutting agents, packaging and 
scales. 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense; or 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime(s) of UNLAWFUL DI§W5BBT/f>0Ji OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE FOR VALUE and UNLAWFUL POSSESS I OITpP' fcnOi^TRQU-ED SUBSTANCE 
WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE IT FOR VALUE
 ut:h
u
* "Trs*n^'^ffihl ^ 
™i, Z ^ * S 2 i * u f c J ^ * * State o/ Tifv ih», TT* titQVr&k lake Z? "*"*• S,a'«> 0  
cterk. 
PAGE TWO 
SEARCH WARRANT 
You are therefore commanded: 
(X) at any time day or night (good cause having been shown) 
(X) to execute without notice of authority or purpose, (proof 
under oath being shown that the object of this search may 
be quickly destroyed or disposed of or that harm may 
result to any person if notice were given) 
to make a search of the above-named or described premises for the 
herein-above described property or evidence and if you find the same 
or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Fifth 
Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such 
property in your custody, subject to the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this S day of March, 1987. 
°\ 
JUDGE OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT 
'- ) / , c 
RETURN TO SEARCH WARRANT 
NO. 
The personal property (tf£tf££&Xfc$*#tf/set out on the inventory 
attached hereto) was taken from the premises located and described 
as 533 South Montgomery, 1575 West 
and from the vehicle(s) described as n/a 
and from the person(s) of n/a 
by virtue of a search warrant dated the 10th day of March 
19JT1 
and executed by Judge Sheila McCleve 
of the above-entitled court: Fifth Circuit Court of Salt Lake. 
I, Michael Droubay , by whom this warrant was executed, 
do swear that the (xfcatKfc/attached) inventory contains a true and 
detailed account of all the property taken by me under the warrant, 
on the 10th day of March, 1982. 
All of the property taken by virtue of said warrant will be 
retained in «y custody subject to the order of this court of or any 
other court in which the offense in respect to which the property or 
things taken, is triable. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me 
this day of
 :* t (^^C 
The following will be a list of items seized pusuant to 
a search warrant at the address of 533 South Montgomery, (1575 
West), on the date of March 10th, 1987: 
Page A: 
#1: One package containing less than one gram of marijuana. 
#2: One package containing twenty-one suspected amphetamines 
#3: Three one gram bindles of cocaine. 
#4: Less than one gram of marijuana. 
#5: Less than one gram of marijuana. 
#6: Less than one gram of marijuana. 
Page B: 
#1: One bottle of Inositol capsules. 
#2: One index card listing transactions. 
#3: One box of scales, paper bindles, and baggies with 
residue. 
#4: One deposit slip with STEVE and BABETTE's name, and 
this address. 
#5: One bong. 
#6: One tin plate and coke straw. 
#7: One Dial-O-Gram scale. 
#8: One package containing seeds, (marijuana). 
#9: Zip-loc baggies, straw, and razor blade. 
#10: Assorted paraphernalia. 
ADDENDUM B 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
County Attorney 
By: HOWARD R. LEMCKE 
Deputy County Attorney 
Courtside Office Building 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
): ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: SHEILA MCCLEVE 450 SOUTH 200 EAST 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he has reason to believe 
That (X) on the premises known as 533 South Montgomery, 1575 West, 
the east side of a red brick duplex, with white trim and 
a red front porch with black rod iron railing. 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there 
is now certain property or evidence described as: 
Cocaine, a white powdery substance, cutting agents, packaging and 
scales. 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense; or 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime(s) of UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE FOR VALUE and UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE IT FOR VALUE. 
PAGE TWO 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant 
are: 
Your affiant is a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff with two 
and a half years of law enforcement experience. Your affiant is 
presently assigned to the Narcotics Division. Your affiant has been 
trained by P.O.S.T., Utah Police Academy, in the identification of 
narcotics. Your affiant has also received continued education and 
training regarding narcotic dealings through experienced police 
officers and on the job experience. 
Within the past ten days, between the period of February 24th 
and March 5th, 1987, your affiant has executed two controlled buys of 
cocaine, using a confidential informant. Hereafter, referred to as 
C.I. to obtain cocaine at 533 South Montgomery, the east duplex, Salt 
Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
On the first occasion, the C.I. met with your affiant, and 
assisting Detectives, where the C.I. was searched. The C.I. had no 
money, nor controlled substances, on his person. The C.I. was given 
$275.00, consisting of two $100.00 bills, three $20.00 bills, one 
$10.00 bill, and one $5.00 bill, and given instructions to purchase 
3.5 grams of cocaine, known as an "eight ball". 
At that point, the C.I. left your affiant's vehicle and 
walked directly to 4545 Atherton, in the Lexia Haven Apartment 
Complex, building #7, Apartment 144. He was observed by your affiant 
to enter that apartment building. He did not make any stops, divert 
his paths, or make contacts with anyone, up to that point. 
Approximately two minutes later, a male white, approximately 
S'*)11, 150 pounds, blonde, curly hair, known as RANDY, was observed by 
your affiant leaving the apartment, went to the parking lot, and got 
into a 1982 Datsun, red in color, Utah listing: MVT 214. This 
suspect was then followed by the Narcotics Squad to 533 South 
Montgomery. He made no stops, nor did he divert his path, prior to 
arriving at the Montgomery address. The suspect parked his car in 
front of the Montgomery address, and was observed by myself and 
Deputy Herlin, to enter the east door of the red brick duplex at that 
time. The suspect stayed there for approximately twenty-two minutes, 
and then was observed by Deputy Judd leaving the same door of the 
residence, getting back into his vehicle, and then again proceeded 
south bound on Interstate 15. 
He was followed by myself and the Narcotics Squad, directly 
back to 4545 Atherton, Apartment #144. He made no stops, nor did he 
divert his path this time either. The suspect arrived back at the 
apartment in approximately fifteen minutes, walked directly from his 
car back into the apartment, where approximately five minutes later, 
the C.I. was observed to exit the apartment, and walk directly back 
to your affiant's vehicle. 
PAGE Three 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The C.I. was re-searched at that tine, finding no U.S. 
Currency, or controlled substances on him, besides a small paper 
bindle, inside a plastic bag, which contained a white powdery 
substance. The package, containing the white powdery substance, was 
field tested by your affiant. A portion of which resulted in a 
positive indication for cocaine. 
C.I. stated that at the time affiant was aware that RANDY was 
at the Montgomery address, C.I. received, at the Atherton address, a 
phone call from RANDY saying the "stuff11 is on a scale and that RANDY 
would be back. 
Your affiant received information, at that time, from the 
C.I. as he entered the apartment, he was greeted by the suspect, 
known to us as RANDY. He handed the currency to RANDY, and RANDY 
then left the apartment for parts unknown to purchase the cocaine. 
On the second occasion, the C.I. met with your affiant and 
assisting detectives, where the C.I. was searched again, finding no 
U. S. currency or controlled substances on him. At that point, he 
was given $220.00 in U. S. currency, consisting of two $100.00 bills, 
and one $20.00 bill. The C.I. was given instructions at that time to 
purchase two grams of cocaine. The C.I. got back into his vehicle, 
which had also been searched by your affiant, drove directly to 4545 
Atherton, Apartment #144. He did not divert his path, nor make 
contact with anybody. He then left his vehicle and walk directly to 
apartment #144, and was given entrance. 
Approximately three minutes later, the same suspect, known as 
RANDY, exited the apartment and walked directly to the 1979 Mercury 
Monarc, with Utah listing: 161 AMW. He got into the vehicle and 
proceeded out of the apartment complex, east on 45th South, and north 
on Interstate 15, followed by the entire Narcotics Squad. 
The suspect remained northbound on Interstate 15 to the 
Redwood Road exit, took the Redwood Road exit to 5th South, went from 
5th South, directly to 533 South Montgomery, where he was observed by 
Deputy Rigby to walk directly to 533 Montgomery and enter. This 
being sixteen minutes, from the time he left the Atherton address. 
The suspect stayed inside the residence for approximately 
eight minutes, and then was observed by Deputy Rigby to exit the 
residence, walk directly to his car, and proceeded to 5th South, then 
to Redwood Road, then back to Interstate 15 southbound. 
At this point, the suspect drove directly back to 4545 
Atherton, #144, without diverting his path, or making contact with 
anybody. He was observed by Deputy Rigby to park the car in the 
parking lot, and walk directly to #144 and enter. 
PAGE FOUR 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
One minute later, your affiant observed the C.I. exit the 
residence, walk directly to his vehicle, and drive to a pre-arranged 
point, without diverting his path, or making contact with anyone. He 
was re-searched approximately four minutes, as was his vehicle, 
finding no controlled substances, other than a small paper bindle, 
containing a white powdery substance, which he was instructed to 
order from the suspect known as RANDY. 
The package that contained the white powdery substance, a 
portion of which was tested by your affiant. It resulted in a 
positive indication for cocaine. 
Your affiant considers the information received from the confidential 
informant reliable because (if any information is obtained from an 
unnamed source) 
Your affiant and assisting Detectives, have had the C.I. 
purchase cocaine on at least eight separate occasions, and each 
representation made was born out by producing either cocaine or 
marijuana. The C.I. has also purchased marijuana and cocaine on 
several occasions for your affiant and assisting Detectives. 
Your affiant has verified the above information from the confidential 
informant to be correct and accurate through the following 
independent investigation: 
Your affiant has used information given to him by the C.I. to 
•ake arrests of your narcotic dealers, said to obtain other search 
warrants. The previous search warrants obtained by your affiant and 
other Narcotic Detectives using information, and controlled buys from 
the C.I. have all been confirmed by producing controlled substances, 
as a result of the authorized searches, including narcotics 
packaging, and resulting in arrests of persons for violation on those 
premises. 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the 
seizure of said items: 
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason to 
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior to it 
being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for 
other good reasons, to-wit: 
Your affiant has purchased cocaine, via the C.I. on two 
different occasions. Independant surveillance also supports the fact 
that there is heavier traffic at night, and that the persons residing 
in the residence are usually away during the day. 
PAGE FIVE 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer executing 
the requested warrant not be required to give notice of the officer's 
authority or purpose because: 
(X) the property sought 
oft or secreted. 
may be quickly destroyed, disposed 
AFFIANT / V 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this /f)rftday of March, 1987. 
'-^U U:.... _ .^ 
JUDSE'IN'THE FI/TH CIRCUIT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH 
